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Trade Liberalization and Environmental Quality:
Opposing Viewpoints, Additional Issues,
and the Necessity of Intervention
John R. Ubben
ABSTRACT. International trade, while promoting economic growth and development, is
one of many suspects contributing to excessive rates of environmental degradation. Free
trade compromises environmental quality in favor of welfare improvements and economic
prosperity. The difficulty of measuring environmental amenities, trade theory’s inability
to address externalities and decisions overtime, and numerous market failures regarding
socially optimal prices, serve as red flags requiring intervention. The most successful form
of intervention is domestic policies that internalize externalities. Intervention is also
necessary to balance the interests of environmentalists and free traders and to ensure that
the gains from trade are devoted to environmental protection.
“We ought to move to the objective of allowing our state to become number
one, not in the protection of toxic substances, but in the prosecution of those
who are polluting our environment.” Dan Morales, Texas State Legislator (D)
Oct., 1990

Introduction
International trade has become one of President Clinton’s primary
strategies for continued domestic economic growth. The signing of the
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
on April 15, 1994 was done with the objectives that the agreement would
create jobs in the U.S., improve the international competitiveness of U.S.
industries, contribute to economic growth, and in general improve the
standard of living of U.S. citizens [Executive Summary, 1994, ES-1].
Environmentalists, who have until recently conducted their work
separately from trade-policy makers, argue that the agreement designed
to promote international trade compromises environmental quality. At the
other end of the spectrum, free traders believe that trade barriers need to
be further reduced to improve economic welfare and that trade
liberalization actually benefits the environment. Each side presents
convincing evidence to support its claims. As is the case with most
disputes, the best solution lies somewhere in the middle.
This paper attempts to address the effects that environmental
regulations have on trade and trade liberalization’s impact on

Major Themes in Economics, Spring 1999

41

environmental quality. In addition, evidence will be provided to support
the claim that there are efficiency concerns underlying the concept of
trade liberalization that require some form of intervention to correct.
Other issues such as the role that population and income growth plays in
environmental degradation, international commodity agreements, and
correcting for the limitations of trade theory are also addressed.

Sources of Conflict
There are many factors that have led to the conflict between international
trade policy and environmental quality. Perhaps the greatest cause of the
clash between the two is the increased attention now given to
environmental issues. A Wall Street Journal / NBC News poll conducted
in 1991 found that 8 out of 10 Americans consider themselves
environmentalists [Esty, 1994, 10]. Americans in general are simply
more aware of environmental issues, some for the right reasons and others
because of the sensationalist doomsday predictions reported in the news
media. Awareness is warranted, however, because environmental
degradation in lesser-developed countries has increased drastically over
the past twenty years [Lopez, 1992, 1138]. Because of its increased
popularity, politicians pay greater attention to this issue. Members of
Congress are also monitored by an organization called the League of
Conservative Voters that rates politicians on the progress they make on
environmental issues [Esty, 1994, 10].
A second, more theoretical reason for the disagreement between trade
policy and environmental quality is the failure of policy-makers on two
issues. First, politicians worldwide have failed to enact legislation that
internalizes environmental costs, which would make consumers and
producers pay the socially optimal price for the pollution they cause.
Second, lawmakers have been sidetracked by special interest groups as
each one attempts to swing legislation on trade in their favor [Esty, 1994,
4]. A related issue is the lack of understanding of how trade rules affect
the environment and GATT’s previous inability to clearly determine
environmental issues [Whalley & Hamilton, 1996, 97]. “This reflects the
fact that the norms and institutions of international trade remain rooted in
the pre-environmental era and that there exists no international regime to
protect ecological values to reconcile competing goals and priorities”
[Esty, 1994, 4].
Lastly, the conflict is the result of a dispute over the relative scientific
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importance of environmental issues the world faces. For example, if one
were to believe the upper level estimates that climate change would have
on the world economy, reducing world GDP by 20%, then sacrificing
gains from free trade over the same time period would be a minor cost in
preventing climate change. On the other hand, if one assumes the
likelihood of climate change to be zero, then interfering with trade is not
justified based on climate change [Esty, 1994, 41].

Goals and Concerns of Free Traders
The basic goal of trade negotiators is to lower trade barriers to increase
economic welfare. They realize that the benefits from trade liberalization
are scattered over many different groups, but in general results in lower
prices, increased choices, and possible export opportunities in the future
[Esty, 1994, 36]. Free traders also believe that trade liberalization will
promote economic prosperity. This will create additional resources that
can be devoted to environmental protection.
The greatest fear of those promoting free trade is that environmental
regulations will serve as a new form of protectionism resulting in lost
economic opportunities. Free traders believe that trade restrictions based
on environmental policies will prevent foreign producers from entering
new markets and therefore decrease the efficiency gains from trade [Esty,
1994, 12]. Free traders also worry that reliance on trade restrictions to
further environmental protection will have economic costs that exceeds
the benefits [Esty, 1994, 38]. They also fear that groups other than
environmentalists will use environmental regulations to safeguard market
positions and to extract monopoly rents. An example of this took place
in February of 1994 when French officials held up the import of fresh fish
due to health inspections. The inspections did little to protect public
health or the environment, but French fishermen gained from the rejection
of lower-cost imports [Esty, 1994, 45]. Labor unions in the U.S. are also
quick to support protection based on working conditions in other
countries, serving to reduce competition from lower wage countries
[Whalley & Hamilton, 1996, 102].
Free traders disagree with efforts to control for differences in
environmental standards to compensate countries with higher standards
for a reduction in competitiveness due to higher compliance costs. They
believe that this will eliminate comparative advantages which are the
basis for economic gains from trade [Esty, 1994, 2]. Free traders also feel
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that the use of trade restrictions to promote environmental issues will be
done unilaterally, resulting in the collapse of an already delicate trade
balance [Esty, 1994, 2]. The primary disagreement with environmentalists is that once environmental regulations are in place, they may
be set in stone because government officials will be afraid to change them
for fear of being labeled anti-environment. The fundamental issue, then,
is being able to distinguish between environmental regulations that distort
trade but promote legitimate environmental concerns from those that
distort trade and have little or no impact on the environment [Harold &
Runge, 1993, 789].

The Environmentalists’ View
Environmentalists view trade liberalization as an invitation for increased
pollution, the loss of one’s own standards, and policies that are made by
absent, unaccountable, business-driven politicians. Environmentalists
feel that the rules of international trade have not caught up with the fact
that the environment knows no political boundaries [Esty, 1994, 18].
Because of this, environmentalists put great emphasis on public
participation in decision making so that business interests do not
dominate the process. Environmentalists benefit from the broad review
of environmental issues allowing them to gain strength and to affect trade
decisions [Esty, 1994, 36].
A basic claim of many environmental groups is that lower
environmental standards elsewhere will strengthen the business argument
over competitive disadvantage, which will have a significant impact on
the stringency of new environmental laws. Free trade will essentially
mean losing one’s own standards [Esty, 1994, 23]. According to Jagdish
Bhagwati, the only choice environmentalists see is between having free
trade without prior agreement on environmental standards which will
lower U.S. standards, or forcing foreign standards to reach acceptable
levels before trade takes place [1993, 45]. Environmentalists fear that
industries will try to externalize pollution costs to improve their position
relative to the competition. In this regard, environmentalists disapprove
of economic growth because it fails to recognize the costs of
environmental degradation and the incentive to avoid internalizing them
[Esty, 1994, 36-37]. “In fact, in the absence of regulation, producers have
incentive not to handle their own waste but to send them up a smokestack
or out an effluent pipe, externalizing costs they would otherwise have to
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bear” [Esty, 1994, 46].
The environmentalist camp is split on the issue of sustainable
development. Some environmentalists subscribe to the notion of “limits
to growth” and are opposed to economic development and therefore to
almost all forms of trade. The other faction accepts sustainable
development and sees economic growth as positive, as long as it is
accomplished in environmentally friendly ways. This group seeks to
secure gains from trade for environmental purposes and implement
environmental standards to ensure that free trade is sustainable [Esty,
1994, 61].
Environmentalists opposed to trade argue that in the short run, free
trade will increase pollution because of the increased economic activity
it creates. The bottom line for these environmentalists is based on what
are called scale effects. Specifically, trade generates wealth that enables
individuals to consume more goods as well as nonrenewable and
renewable resources well above their natural regenerative rates. Damage
can also result from increased production. For example, NAFTA created
the possibility for increased manufacturing facilities in Mexico,
increasing the environmental stress near the U.S.-Mexico boarder [Esty,
1994, 43].
Environmentalists also argue that trade liberalization carries with it
market entry agreements that force environmental regulations to take a
back seat. The trade-off in this regard is between the easy access to
foreign markets allowing producers to achieve scale economies (reduced
prices for consumers) and the ability of individual countries to design
environmental regulations suited to its own unique conditions. For
example, each country will want to take into consideration factors such
as climate, weather patterns, population growth, aversion to risk, and
existing pollution levels before it makes a decision on the level of
environmental standards [Esty, 1994, 43].
In a stride toward harmonization, environmentalists want to be able
to use trade restrictions as a means to address cross-boundary pollution
and to enforce international environmental agreements [Esty, 1994, 203].
Jagdish Bhagwati warns of the dangers of harmonization. Harmonization
contradicts the very objective that environmentalists want to achieve, the
freedom to set one’s own environmental standards. Bhagwati argues that
harmonization ignores the idea that a nation must make environmental
decisions that reflect economic conditions and social preference within
its boundaries. “We should not ask of others what we would not accept
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from them” [Bhagwati, 1993,45].

Common Ground
Environmentalists and free traders do share some common ground on two
issues. Both groups believe that environmental quality and trade policy
can coexist by making sure that environmental resources are optimally
priced. Environmentalists take stock in the importance of cost
internalization laid out by economists. Greater education has led to the
understanding of the polluter-pays principle and the potential it has for
making trade and environmental policies compatible [Esty, 1994, 38].

Environmental Regulations’ Affect on Trade
When considering whether trade harms or helps the environment, one
must also examine the other side of this coin. Do environmental
regulations have an effect on international trade? In 1992, world trade in
merchandise and services reached $4.7 trillion and was a primary force
in the increase of global output [Esty, 1994, 20]. In the U.S. alone, every
billion dollars of national export creates approximately 14,500 jobs.
Americans also lose an estimated $70 billion annually due to trade
barriers. With respect to environmental quality, the question remains:
will trade barriers based on environmental protection decrease the $270
billion expected global gains from trade liberalization approved at the
Uruguay Round? [Esty, 1994, 20].
According to Duncan Brack, who acknowledges the fact that efforts
to protect the environment may create trade barriers, a reduction in gains
from trade resulting from environmental regulations may be true only in
the short run. He suggests that over a period of time the regulations may
change direction and strength as they are amended to keep pace with
changes in understanding [Brack, 1998, 48]. As a qualification to this
finding, most studies have only researched short-term effects. More
research needs to be done on the long run effects of environmental
policies. Other models found that the conflict between trade and
environmental policies, including those where lower standards exist,
suggest that overall global economic performance will only be slightly
restricted [Whalley & Hamilton, 1996, 93]. For example, Low conducted
a study in 1992 that looked at pollution abatement costs incurred by U.S.
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domestic industries and the potential effects on Mexican exports to the
U.S. were the U.S. to levy special import taxes to offset these costs. Low
concluded that the trade impacts are small. “His study shows that U.S.
industry’s pollution control expenditures represent only a small
component of total costs, with only 18 of 123 industries paying more than
1% of the value of their output” [Whalley & Hamilton, 1996, 91]. Thus
the impact of such a tax would be small, reducing Mexico’s exports by
less than 2% [Whalley & Hamilton, 1996, 91].
Researchers have failed to explore the impact that wide-ranging
environmental regulations such as a global carbon tax might have.
Studies conducted by Whalley and Wigle (1991) and Piggot, Whalley,
and Wigle (1992) found that carbon taxes could have a large effect on
international trade [Whalley & Hamilton, 1996, 92]. “The presence of
large carbon taxes which apply to a significant input component feeding
through to manufacturing is large. The result is a potential major impact
on international trade in manufactures and changes in trade patterns”
[Whalley & Hamilton, 1996, 92]. At the extreme, global carbon taxes
could completely stop the growth in world trade and reverse the trend
trade liberalization has helped to create in the last 40 years [Whalley &
Hamilton, 1996, 93].

Population and Income Growth
To qualify the discussion on trade’s impact on the environment, it is first
important to examine the affects that population and income growth has
had on pollution. Logic would lead one to believe that an overall increase
in population would be a major cause of environmental degradation and
it probably is. However, it is worth noting that recent studies seems to
indicate the opposite in certain regions of the world. Through the
econometric analysis of 54 tropical countries, Burgess found a negative
relationship between population growth and deforestation [Lutz, 1992,
1155]. The explanation for this counter-intuitive finding is that resource
conservation practices are labor intensive in highland and tropical
regions. “A study by Garcia-Barrios and Garcia-Barrios in the state of
Oaxaca, Mexico, and another one by Collins in Puno, Peru, concluded
that a major source of environmental degradation and agricultural
productivity loss has been insufficient rather than excessive population
growth” [Lopez, 1992, 1140]. This phenomenon is common only in the
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highlands of Latin America; these effects have not been recorded
anywhere else [Lopez, 1992, 1140].
The other factor often linked to environmental degradation and
pollution is a country’s level of income. Here the relationship is not so
clear. At the extremes, it seems that countries that are relatively either
extremely wealthy or poor pollute the least, while developing countries
stuck in the middle tend to have the highest levels of pollution. There is
empirical evidence to support the claim that rich countries can afford and
do have higher environmental standards that in general raise the quality
of air and water. The point is that environmental quality is a luxury good,
with a high income elasticity.

Trade Liberalization Benefits the Environment
How might trade liberalization help the environment?
Trade
liberalization can benefit the environment in a number of ways. Free
trade can promote the transfer of genetic material and technology that can
improve agricultural development and environmental protection in the
form of a reduction in chemical use. Trade liberalization can also help
improve the efficiency of resource allocation by removing inefficient
prices and subsidies. Trade also encourages environmentally sustainable
use. Finally, trade can be argued to be a key factor in the increase in
environmental standards and increase the speed with which developing
countries reach the environmental stage because it serves to increase
income [Brack, 1998, 1, 14].
In the area of biotechnology, the transfer of biological pest controls,
such as predator organisms and genetically developed crops resistant to
disease and insects, can reduce the dependence on chemicals. In
agriculture, the transfer of farming practices such as crop rotation and low
till or no till farming, can be instrumental in developing sustainable
agriculture practices and reducing soil erosion in lesser-developed
countries [Zilberman, 1992, 1145]. Trade liberalization may also serve
to break down exchange rate policies that subsidize the importation of
chemicals. Hence, free trade could reduce chemical usage and lead to
environmental improvement [Antel, 1993, 784].
Trade liberalization can help improve resource allocation by
removing inefficient prices. Trade liberalization can improve resource
allocation by allowing countries to specialize in the production of goods
and services in which they are most efficient. Efficiency allows a country
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to maximize its output for a given level of resources. It can be argued that
the efficient allocation of resources is a step toward environmentally
sustainable development [Brack, 1998, 1]. If an allocation is Pareto
optimal, than there are no other allocation of resources that could make
one group better off without hurting any other group. As long as
environmental quality is taken into consideration when resources are
allocated, then, in theory, trade that promotes efficiency will benefit the
environment.
Trade can also serve to increase environmental standards in the
manufacturing sector. Companies who produce goods for export face a
number of different standards, some higher than others. It is simply easier
and more cost effective to produce products to meet the highest standards,
so when the company looks to expand into new markets it will have the
advantage of already complying with standards regarding the
environment, labeling, safety, and many other factors [Brack, 1998, 14].
An increased rate of growth of income caused by trade can help
promote environmental quality. Increased income creates potential for
investment in environmental protection and may also speed up the
transition from purely economic concerns to a balance of environmental
and economic growth for developing countries [Antel, 1993, 787].
However, this link is not automatic and policies will need to be
implemented to ensure environmental concerns are pursued
simultaneously. “Poverty per se is a form of environmental degradation
and thus economic well-being is an environmental plus, regardless of its
effect on pollution control or environmental protection efforts” [GATT
Secretariat, Esty, 1994, 64].
The study performed by Perroni and Wigle (1994) is most often cited
for the lack of impact trade restrictions, and therefore trade, have on the
environment and the type of intervention most successful in promoting
environmental protection. The authors attempted to assess international
trade’s relationship to environmental degradation by examining the
effects on environmental quality and welfare of the following
environmental policies: 1) Business as usual (current environmental
protection levels). 2) A move to full global internalization meaning, that
the internalization rate for the domestic and international components of
environmental externalities is 1 or 100%. 3) Unilateral domestic
environmental action by North America, meaning that the internalization
rate for the domestic component of environmental externalities was 1 or
100% in North America. The authors also examined three trade-policy
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scenarios: 1) benchmark trade barriers; 2) a removal of all trade barriers
(free trade); 3) a three-fold increase in trade barriers (trade wars).
Environmental damage was measured locally in terms of emissions
summed for all sectors in a region, and globally by summing all sectors
in all regions. “The relationship between emissions experienced and
environmental damage is modeled by means of convex, constant elasticity
damage function:
DL(EL) = kL(EL)pl
DG (EG ) = kG (EG )pg

Where D = environmental damage
EL & EG are the sum of net local and
global emissions
L
k & kG are constants
pl
& pg represent elasticities of damage
with respect to emissions (assumed to
be greater than 1)” [Perroni & Wigle,
1994, 552-558].

Environmental quality was then modeled on the consumption side of the
economy as the difference between endowments of environmental quality
and damage. A utility function described by consumption goods and
environmental quality was used to measure individual valuations of
environmental quality. Environmental policies were described in the
model using emission fees that internalized some or all of the external
costs associated with emissions. The revenue from these taxes went to
the residents of the country where the emissions took place [Perroni &
Wigle, 1994, 552-558].
The primary factors of production and trade were labor and capital,
which were modeled as domestically mobile but internationally immobile.
In the model, this prevented dirty industries from moving to regions with
lower emission taxes. Finally, six goods were chosen, representing both
industries having high emission levels and those with low levels, as well
as high technology and low technology industries. These goods were also
identified by their intensities related to labor, skills, capital, and
environmental inputs. Countries were then grouped together by their per
capita income level and their environmental quality relative to one
another [Perroni & Wigle, 1994, 552-558].
By examining trade in these products, environmental damage caused
by their production, and environmental policies crossed against each
trade-policy scenario, the researchers drew important conclusions on the
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relationship between trade and the environment. At the benchmark level
of the trade-policy scenario, international trade had a small adverse affect
on environmental quality. The removal of all trade barriers resulted in a
slight worsening of environmental quality, while a three-fold increase in
trade barriers had only a small positive impact on the environment
[Perroni & Wigle, 1994, 561-562].
The welfare effect on different regions tells a much different story.
Trade liberalization had the greatest benefit for the U.S., Canada, and
other developed countries, while the remaining regions saw small or no
gains. However, trade regulations/barriers had a substantial negative
effect on welfare for all regions. Other results showed that all regions had
more than a 39% improvement in environmental quality when
externalities were fully internalized regardless of the trade-policy
scenario. On the other hand, environmental quality improvements were
never more than 2% when trade barriers were used to address
environmental issues. The conclusion is that the trade policies of
different regions in the study (benchmark, free trade, trade wars) had very
little impact on environmental quality compared to the effects of
environmental policies (business as usual, global internalization,
unilateral NA action) [Perroni & Wigle, 1994, 563]. This suggests that
international trade’s impact on environmental quality is modest at best.
Other conclusions can be drawn from this study. When developed
regions practiced domestic internalization, improvements in
environmental quality resulted for all regions. However, the addition of
trade restrictions based on environmental concerns had no added effect
on environmental quality. This supports the fact that environmental
policies need not be accompanied by trade barriers [Perroni & Wigle,
1994, 563].
This model has a few limitations. There is a limited knowledge on
how emissions affect the environment, and the model does not take into
consideration the damaged caused by the consumption of goods. The fact
that perfect competition was used and capital mobility was limited
adversely affected the impact of both trade and environmental regulations.
The authors suggest that environmental achievements made via trade
barriers are likely to be smaller than the amount predicted because world
production has a small trade component. Trade in environmentally safe
goods is already prevalent, and even for some pollution intensive goods
the cost of abatement is sometimes included in total costs [Perroni &
Wigle, 1994, 566].
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Trade Liberalization Damages the Environment
The effects trade liberalization has on the environment are difficult to
predict. Lopez argues that free trade only serves to bring domestic prices
more in line with world prices and there is no reason to believe that one
set of prices is better for the environment that the other [1992, 1141].
Then there are those who argue that international trade has a negative
effect on environmental quality. Some suggest that free trade can result
in the expansion of agricultural production on to highly erodible, more
marginal land, increase unsustainable economic activity, disrupt the
traditional institutions of the world’s poor, and result in the specialization
of capital intensive activities. In addition, trade liberalization can create
changes in the domestic terms of trade and cause nations to be used as
dumping grounds.
Trade liberalization can serve to promote unsustainable patterns of
economic development if environmental externalities are not factored into
prices or the decision-making process. The result is increased pollution
and the depletion of the country’s natural resources [Brack. 1998, 2]. A
related point is that without express environmental protection, trade rules
set multilaterally will tend to neglect environmental issues that arise
during the time between economic growth and increased environmental
protection, as well as overlook differences in each country’s individual
effort to achieve environmental sustainability [Esty, 1994, 64, & Brack,
1998, 2].
As discussed earlier, the transfer of technology in the biotechnical
field can benefit countries. However, there is a downside to such trade.
In some cases, transferred species have had a negative impact on the local
environment. Examples of this include rabbits in Australia, and more
recently a beetle from China that has made its way to the U.S., via
imported wood products, that has killed many trees in a number of U.S.
cities. Some agricultural practices and crops have also been found
inappropriate for certain regions of the world [Zilberman, 1992,1145].
Many economists have hypothesized that one of the major causes of
forest biomass and soil depletion is poverty. Lopez, rather, believes that
it is the disruption of traditional institutions and practices of the poor that
is the main cause of rural environmental degradation [1992, 1138]. The
world’s rural poor are extremely dependent upon the natural environment
to survive. Many have no choice but to consume natural resources.
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Lopez believes that free trade can result in the collapse of traditional
practices increasing environmental degradation and trapping the rural
poor in a cycle of poverty [1992, 1138].
How does free trade lead to institutional collapse? Studies conducted
in Asia and Latin America conclude “displacement and loss of
entitlements to resources originated in factors external to the community”
[Lopez, 1992, 1139]. Large-scale agriculture and export-oriented forestry
were among the most frequently mentioned external factors. Stonich uses
the example of Southern Honduras in the 1960’s and 70’s to demonstrate
this effect. During this time booming commodity prices drove an increase
of exported-oriented agricultural products.
This process was
accomplished by investments in infrastructure and the extension of credit
subsidies. The result was a major reallocation of land from either forests
or production of food crops to pasture for livestock or production of
export crops. Many small farmers lost their land both by legal and illegal
means to make room for the land-intensive commercial livestock and
crops, and were forced to work as farm hands on the land they once
owned [Lopez, 1992, 1139].
When commodity prices fell, the landless farmers, who faced lower
employment and wages, were forced to return to self-sufficient means of
survival. However, the extreme degradation of once previously
productive farmland by commercial practices forced peasants to operate
on hilly lands that were more marginal. “This in turn creates a second
wave of environmental destruction, as a large number of peasants were
displaced toward forests and other more marginal areas” [Lopez, 1992,
1139]. This is a good example of how free trade encouraged a country to
take advantage of high commodity prices in the short run and create
extensive environmental damage during and after commercial practices
were no longer profitable. Two factors besides free trade contributed to
environmental degradation and the loss of traditional practices of the rural
poor. First, the Honduran legal system failed to enforce property rights,
which may have also contributed to the disruption of traditional practices.
Second, the government’s investment in infrastructure and the extension
of credit subsidies also facilitated the process.
The argument opposing Lopez’s view is that the same traditional
institutions and practices of the rural poor that protect the environment
keep people poor. It is important to distinguish support for the protection
of the environment through traditional practices from the support of
traditional institutions in order to keep people poor to benefit other groups
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through tourism and higher commodity prices. One must also take into
consideration the values, beliefs, and attitudes of these groups. For some,
their families have been farming and using the land in the same way for
centuries in order to survive. Perhaps they view living in harmony with
the land and the natural environment as a rich and fulfilling way of life
and preserving it for future generations as their duty. Many did not
consider themselves poor until greedy “westerners” began to impose their
standards of rich and poor on them. Before labeling an individual poor
or rich, one needs to consider not only relative and absolute definitions
of poverty, but also the culture and history of the individual.
Being realistic however, few will find a solution to the dilemma that
the traditional institutions, while protecting the environment, keep rural
people in lesser-developed countries poor because that’s how some
people want to live. The fact that the world is becoming one large market
place also makes it a lot easier for lesser-developed countries to adapt the
standards of rich and poor that Western and other developed countries
have. A possible solution may lie in new international commodity
agreements, which will be discussed later.
Finally, trade liberalization can result in specialization in capital
intensive activities. Countries are attracted to the prospect of rapid
economic growth, which can result from capital accumulation. Capitalintensive regions tend to have higher productivity growth rates than the
more traditional labor-intensive regions. According to Lopez, “countries
have two basic mechanisms to increase the profitability of capital,
( i ) compressing real wages in the short run through various direct and
indirect means (indirect means such as investment subsidies, and the
provision of specific infrastructure to reduce capital costs that are
financed out of general taxation are probably more important than direct
means). ( ii ) Minimizing any environmental restrictions that could have
a negative effect on the profitability of capital” [Lopez, 1992, 1141].
Hence, one can see how the attractiveness of rapid economic growth from
capital accumulation could lead to choices that put the environment at
risk.
Countries are also attracted to the easy money that can be made by
serving as storage areas for waste materials. Such actions obviously
increase risks to the health of both citizens and the environment, while
reducing similar risks in the producer country. The income that is
generated may or may not be directed to measures designed to offset the
export of environmental quality.
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International Commodity Agreements
International commodity agreements (ICAs) are relevant to the discussion
on international trade liberalization and the environment, not only for the
role it may play in resolving the dilemma traditional institutions of the
world’s rural poor create, but for three other reasons as well. The first
important topic regarding the environment and the development of third
world countries concerning ICAs is the decreasing significance of
national borders. Many environmental externalities are now felt on a
transnational scale. For example, “the pollution of oceans, acid rain, the
dwindling of species, the greenhouse effect, and global warming are
among a few of the phenomena that manifest themselves on a
transnational scale” [Kox, 1992, 933]. It is easy to see why so many
people have a vested interest in the way third world nations go about
achieving development.
Second, many experts are beginning to question the earth’s ability to
regenerate and recover from degradation. Some view earth’s ecological
systems as “nonlinear dynamic systems” and any changes to these
systems my result in completely different conditions for future
generations [Kox, 1991, 933]. Hence, curbing the desire to consume
nonrenewable resources in developed and developing nations now will
lessen the burden on future generations.
Third, the existence of global inequality in the distribution of natural
resources is unsustainable in the long run. To illustrate this, one-fifth of
the world’s population consumes over 70% of the commercial energy
produced annually [Kox, 1991, 933]. Environmental problems will grow
exponentially when the billions of people located in developing countries
begin to claim their share of the world’s energy. Taking into
consideration the goals for development of each country, the world can
simply not support them all without some degree of global redistribution
[Kox, 1992, 933].
In the past, international commodity agreements have failed for a
couple of reasons. First, a problem with proposals in the past has been
their roots in a “strong central fiscal and legal national authority to
guarantee tax collections, legal entitlements, and liability rules” [Kox,
1991, 934]. Clearly, on an international level these assumptions do not
apply. Second, some have proposed the implementation of international
tolls for common access resources such as the oceans and air space. The

Major Themes in Economics, Spring 1999

55

problem with this proposal is that determining the toll becomes subjective
and there is only an indirect connection between pollution and its costs
to the environment [Kox, 1991, 934].
In 1987, 60 developing nations counted on the export of primary
commodities (agriculture & forest products) for more than half of their
earnings from exports. “In 25 of these countries, commodities
represented 80% or more of exports” [Kox, 1991, 935]. These countries
depend on the same type of commodity exports that destroyed traditional
practices and extensively damaged the environment. To make up for
times when prices were low they simply exported a greater volume
pushing the environment beyond its limits. The structure of international
trade and tariffs also ensures that developing countries have comparative
advantages in pollution intensive industries such as agriculture, forestry,
and mining. Add to this the fact that it is difficult to internalize
externalities in international commodity markets, it is worth while to
examine international commodity agreements [Kox, 1991 935].
International commodity agreements are an opportunity to regulate
international prices, production, and consumption of primary
commodities in an effort to internalize environmental costs. The result
of such an agreement is a price increase sufficient to cover more costly
yet environmentally safe forms of producing such commodities [Kox,
1991, 937]. Before such agreements can be accomplished extensive
research needs to be done. A complete analysis of the environmental
effects of commodity production in the main producing countries needs
to be undertaken. Alternative production techniques and their economic
costs need to be analyzed. The elasticity of demand for the commodities
and the form of the price mark up round out the considerations that need
to be examined in the first phase [Kox, 1991, 937].
The second phase, and perhaps the more difficult one, requires
negotiating a political agreement on the acceptable level of environmental
damage, the amount of the price mark up, and the form of this price mark
up (import surcharge, export tax, or other) [Kox, 1991,938].
In order for ICAs to be successful the commodity market must be
homogenous in quality. As with any cartel, the main producing countries
must agree to participate, but an ICA also requires the participation of
consuming nations as well so that “transactions outside the sphere of the
ICA are limited” [Kox, 1991, 940]. Finally, a stable supply is important
to avoid arguments between traditional producers and new comers as well
as deal with different production costs in different nations. Ideally, a
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commitment to preserving the environment and therefore a dedication to
the agreement will secure price premiums necessary for environmentally
safe production methods, addressing development desires and
environmental protection simultaneously [Kox, 1991, 940].

Brief Summary
So far evidence has been given in support of some form of modest
intervention in international trade on behalf of the environment and to
some degree development. The arguments, goals, and concerns of both
free traders and environmentalists suggest that some form of intervention
is necessary to balance the interests each group has and the blind action
the groups take to pursue their objectives. Clearly, evidence suggests that
international trade and its liberalization has some good and bad effects on
the environment. Even the experts demonstrate, whether intentionally or
not, that some form of intervention is necessary. For example, the Perroni
and Wigle study demonstrates that while excessive amounts of
regulations and trade barriers may not be the answer, domestic and
international policies that internalize externalities are extremely
beneficial to the environment, with minimal costs to gains from trade.
On a much more grand scale, international commodity agreements,
with an environmental twist, address the issue of traditional practices of
the poor, development, and environmental protection. Intervention of this
type attempts to accentuate the positives from commodity trade
(improving development) while eliminating some of the negatives
(environmentally harmful production practices).
This overwhelming evidence is provided in lieu of more important
theory based issues the above parties fail to recognize. Through the
analysis of international trade cases, three market failures and three trade
theory limitations will be exposed that require intervention to correct.

The Dolphin/Tuna and EC Nematode Cases
In August of 1990, the U.S. banned imported tuna from Mexico because
it had failed to reduce the number of dolphins that were being killed by
tuna fishermen. Shortly thereafter, Mexico appealed to the GATT panel
on trade disputes saying that the U.S. had no grounds for the ban. The
U.S. felt that it was justified because under GATT Article XX bans were
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allowed to protect endangered species. Mexico argued that no
endangered species were at risk and the GATT panel ruled in favor of
Mexico [Brack, 1998, 30 & Whalley & Hamilton, 1996, 79].
Prior to the GATT ruling Mexico’s tuna exports to the U.S. fell
almost $10 million in anticipation of the trade ban in 1989. The tuna
trade to the U.S. from Mexico bottomed out at $1.2 million from a
previous high of $13 million in 1988 [Brack, 1998, 30].
Before the ban was placed on imported tuna, the U.S Department of
Commerce estimated that Mexico, Venezuela, Vanuatu, Spain, the
Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Panama had dolphin kill
rates that were 2-4 times higher (a total of 100,000 dolphins per year)
than U.S. vessels. Mexico alone was estimated to kill about 50,000
dolphins each year [Brack, 1998, 31]. Dolphins were not the only species
threatened by tuna fishing. “A typical catch of 1,000 tons of tuna
included 2 sharks, 29 dolphins, 5 billfish, and an average of less than 1
sea turtle” [Brack, 1998, 47]. From these numbers one can place a value
of $118 on each dolphin’s life. The trade costs to Mexico of the ban were
at most $11.8 million per year. The trade ban was estimated to save about
100,000 dolphins per year, therefore the value of each dolphin was $118
[Brack, 1998, 47].
This case demonstrates very well the first of three market failures in
international trade that requires some sort of corrective intervention. The
market failure is that the prices producers and consumers of tuna faced
did not reflect the true social cost of production and consumption of tuna.
The prices of canned, fresh, and frozen tuna did not include the cost to
tourists who may have been unable to see dolphins and other species
harmed by tuna fishing in the eastern tropical pacific or the existence
value many people place on the lives of dolphins. The $118 per life
seems to grossly underestimate the dolphin's true social value. Inefficient
prices promoted the excessive harvest of tuna and therefore too many
dolphin deaths.
Inefficient prices are also created by distortionary practices such as
agricultural subsidies and escalated tariffs, which raise or lower prices
above or below what is optimal. Removing subsidies for agriculture and
energy would strengthen trade and the environment by improving
allocative efficiency and reducing protection for environmentally
unsustainable activities [Brack, 1998, 13]. In addition, reducing
artificially high tariffs faced by developing countries on exported
manufactured goods relative to raw materials and products can help
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promote economic diversity, removing dependence on environmentally
damaging resource use [Brack, 1998, 13].
The key to correcting prices that are not socially optimal is the
implementation of the polluter-pays principle or in effect internalizing
externalities. Economic instruments such as taxes and charges, tradeable
permits, and deposit-refund systems can be good compliments to
environmental regulations in an attempt to internalize externalities
[Brack, 1998, 10]. The difficulty of implementing such instruments must
be overcome, because in today’s marketplace inefficiency is the norm not
the exception [Esty, 1994, 66-67]. If this is the case, than trade
liberalization cannot be trusted to allocate resources or to make polluters
face the real cost of their actions.
The second market failure that the dolphin case demonstrates is the
fact that some natural resources tend to be a common access resource,
which can lead to its depletion and degradation. The fact that nobody
owns the sea, or at least a portion of it where dolphins and tuna inhabit,
fishermen are not precluded from exploiting the resource. Without
property rights, fees for the use of the resource cannot be charged, thus
there is no way to exclude fishermen from excessive resource use.
Garrett Hardin described this issue as the “Tragedy of the Commons.”
According to Hardin, the exploitative use of common access resources by
a small number of individuals would have a negligible affect on the
resource. However, this same behavior by a large number of people is
likely to destroy the resource [Esty, 1994, 13]. Government intervention
or the establishment of ownership is necessary in monitoring common
access resources and negotiating prices to limit the use of the resource
[Esty, 1994, 67].
The third market failure which promotes inefficient use of natural
resources and environmental degradation is the lack of consideration for
future generations. The effects on the environment of some economic
practices take a long time to surface, creating an incentive to ignore these
costs at the expense of future generations. For example, in 1990 the
European Commission banned the importation of raw, softwood lumber
from the U.S. and Canada. The ban was enacted to prevent the transfer
of a pinewood nematode, native to North America, to Europe. The
nematode, which is carried from tree to tree by beetles, eats wood. The
nematode does not cause disease in the U.S. and Canada, but when it was
accidentally introduced to Japan by imported lumber it caused a disease
called pine wilt, killing many trees [Brack, 1998, 34].
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Canada was hit hardest by the ban, seeing its lumber exports to
European countries fall from $945.9 million in 1991 to $315.3 million in
1993. Over this same time period the U.S. lost approximately $119.3
million in lumber exports to Europe. Additional costs included $500,000
invested in equipment to meet new import regulations for lumber quality
and an estimated $72 million in yearly production costs [Brack, 1998, 34].
The infestation was prevented at a cost of about $214.2 million per year,
mostly affecting Canada. If the nematode were allowed to enter Europe
the effects would be devastating. Sweden and Finland run wood trade
surpluses of billions of dollars each year, thus the ban may have saved
more than trees, if one considers the number of people who would be out
of work in Europe’s lumber industry [Brack, 1998, 34, 47]. The point is
that all the costs and benefits of the ban are calculated for the short run.
The costs of infestation would affect Europe for decades in more ways
than trade and jobs in the lumber industry. The European Commission
made the right decision to enact the ban, but from a cost-benefit analysis
position had the costs in trade to the U.S. and Canada been equal to or
greater than the benefits to Europe, the EC would have failed to enact an
inherently good trade restriction because it failed to consider the effect
the infestation could have on future generations.
To correct for this problem, Cline argues for the use of a lower
discount rate in cost-benefit studies. Using a lower discount rate will
result in a higher present value of costs associated with environmental
degradation, and also take into account shifts in the tradeoff between
environmental quality and wealth that may occur over time [Esty, 1994,
40].
Without Government intervention, the assignment of property rights,
or the implementation of economic instruments to internalize
externalities, there is no guarantee that trade liberalization will be
economically and environmentally efficient. The benefits of free trade
must be weighed against the true social cost of trade, including the cost
of environmental degradation, regardless of how flawed the valuation
may be. Such actions will only serve to reduce tensions between free
traders and environmentalists and bring the goals of the two groups more
in line with each other [Esty, 1994, 4, 62-63].

Trade Theory Limitations
Many questions set forth in this research paper are based on economic
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and trade theories. To keep questions and answers in perspective, it is
important to talk about the limitations of trade theory for assessing
environmental choices. Environmental amenities are difficult to define
and measure, which makes the application of trade theory (a tool more
suited for examining transferable and tradeable goods) much less precise
[Zilberman, 1992, 1146-47]. For example, placing a value on a dolphin’s
life requires extensive analysis of not only the effects on trade by attempts
to save its life, but also its existence and usage values, as well as the
effects its absence has on the surrounding environment. Tourists' value
the lives of dolphins for the pleasure they receive from seeing the dolphin,
and others that may never see a dolphin have altruistic values of simply
knowing that dolphins exist. Perhaps the most difficult to measure is the
effects the loss of a species has on its surrounding environment.
Biological, chemical, and physical interactions among species in a certain
habitats are only just beginning to be understood by scientists. The costs
to the environment resulting from the loss of a species or the effects of
pollution are hard to calculate [Esty, 1994, 42].
Besides this, three other issues exist which limit trade theory’s
applicability to environmental regulations. The first problem is the issue
of externalities.
Many times the negative health effects of
environmentally damaging activities cannot be contained within the
boundaries of one nation. For example, manufacturing and production
operations in the U.S. create conditions promoting acid rain. The acid
rain, however, is not limited to the U.S., areas in Canada have suffered as
much, if not more than places in the U.S. Trade theory lacks the
mechanisms to correct for suboptimal prices and quantities resulting from
unregulated free trade [Zilberman, 1992, 1147].
The second problem is that the consumption of environmental
amenities now may have irreversible effects. Closely related to the
market failure of ignoring future generations’ preferences, trade theory is
limited in the fact that most models are static or only look at a point in
time. To uncover the real value of environmental amenities one has to
take into account present and future valuations and trade theory models
lack the ability to address decisions over time [Zilberman, 1992, 1147].
Finally, international trade models assume that countries control their
own decisions regarding the use of resources. The fact of the matter is
that larger developed countries use their bargaining power to influence
trade to their advantage, whether it be for economical or environmental
purposes, at the expense of smaller trading partners [Zilberman, 1992,
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1147]. Some cite the Gulf War as an attempt by the U.S. to keep oil
prices low to feed its insatiable appetite for energy.

Conclusion
Trade liberalization is going to remain a force on the international scene
well into the future. International trade, while becoming the primary
force behind welfare improvements and economic prosperity, is also a
suspect in the reduction of environmental quality worldwide. Evidence
supports the fact that to ensure environmental quality is factored into
international trade decisions some form of intervention is necessary.
Intervention is necessary to balance the interests of environmentalists and
free traders. Researchers demonstrate that domestic environmental
policies are an essential precursor to international trade for the
consideration of environmental quality. The research of Perroni and
Wigle suggest that domestic policies, which serve to internalize
externalities, are extremely beneficial to the environment with only
moderate costs to trade.
International commodity agreements provide the opportunity to
address the issues of poverty, traditional practices, and environmental
protection. Intervention in the form of ICAs attempts to achieve the best
of both worlds, emphasizing the positives of commodity trade and
intervention on behalf of the environment.
The market failures identified in the two cases also demonstrate the
importance of intervention. In today’s marketplace inefficiency is often
the norm, not the exception. If this is the case then trade liberalization
cannot be trusted to allocate resources or to make polluters face the real
cost of their actions. Government intervention, the assignment of
property rights, and the implementation of the polluter-pays principle are
necessary to address the market failures of inefficient prices,
intergenerational inequality, and the exploitation of common access
resources. Trade theory also has limitations that prevent trade
liberalization from fully considering the importance of the environment
in transactions. The sheer difficulty of defining and measuring
environmental amenities in itself requires intervention to assure that these
values, regardless of how flawed they may be, are represented in trade
decisions. Trade theory models also lack the ability to adjust for
suboptimal prices and quantities resulting from externalities, the problem
of assessing decisions overtime, and countries who are not in control of
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their own resources. In conclusion, the evidence is overwhelmingly in
favor of at least some form of intervention to find an equilibrium between
international trade liberalization and environmental concerns.
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